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Tax competition is discussed as a source of inefficiency in international taxation and in fiscal 
federalism. Two preconditions for the existence of such effects of tax competition are that mobile 
factors locate or reside in jurisdictions with – ceteris paribus – lower tax rates and that taxes are 
actually set strategically in order to attract mobile production factors. It is well known from studies 
about Swiss cantonal and local income tax competition that Swiss taxpayers reside where income 
taxes are low. In this paper, empirical results on strategic tax setting by cantonal governments are 
presented for a panel of the Swiss cantons from 1984 to 1999. Completing the evidence on Swiss tax 
competition, the income tax rates in cantons are lower, the lower the tax rates of their neighbors. 
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1. Introduction
  Since TIEBOUT (1956), analyses of fiscal federalism have been mainly focused on the
mechanisms and properties of market-like competition between jurisdictions. Tiebout empha-
sizes the efficiency enhancing impact of a voting-by-feet mechanism to help individuals to
find their place of residence where local public goods are provided in accordance with their
preferences. In contrast to that, the modern tax competition literature establishes that such a
competition for mobile production factors between jurisdictions entails numerous sources of
inefficiencies that lead to a suboptimal level of public services or to a race to the bottom in tax
rates (for surveys on the literature see OATES, 1999; WILSON, 1999 and WILSON  and
WILDASIN, 2004). By strategically lowering corporate or individual income tax rates, juris-
dictions may attract mobile capital or labor from other jurisdictions. The outflow of these
factors leads to an increase of the tax burden on factor incomes that remain in the jurisdictions
from which they emigrate or to a decrease in tax revenue that is needed to cover infra-
marginal costs of public goods. Moreover, as SINN (2003) points out, tax competition may
also cause less redistribution and lead to a dismantling of the social welfare state.
  However, authors like SALMON (1987) and BESLEY and CASE (1995) have used alter-
native explanations of public decision-making processes in a setting of fiscal federalism. In a
world of imperfect and asymmetric information, voters have restricted possibilities to assess
the performance of the representatives in their polity. Selfish representatives aim at gathering
political rents and hence have incentives to keep information about their opportunistic be-
havior hidden from voters. However, voters can draw inferences on politicians’ behavior by
comparing it to the performance of governments and parliaments in neighboring jurisdictions.
Other things being equal, these neighbors serve as yardsticks for the voters’ evaluation. A
worse performance in their own jurisdiction compared to other jurisdictions leads to a pun-
ishment of representatives by throwing them out of office in the next elections. In such a con-
cept, public choice would not only be driven by information gathering from neighboring ju– 3–
risdictions, but also by mimicking behavior. Because representatives anticipate the yardstick
mechanism, they are able to stay in power by adapting to the policies of their neighbors.
  A number of articles has presented evidence that tax rates in one jurisdiction are posi-
tively depending on tax rates in neighboring or other competing jurisdictions (LADD, 1992;
CASE, 1993; HEYNDELS and VUCHELEN, 1997; FIGLIO, KOLPIN and REED, 1999; SAAVEDRA,
2000; BRETT and PINKSE, 2000; HAYASHI and BOADWAY, 2001; BRUECKNER and SAAVEDRA,
2001; BÜTTNER, 2001; BORDIGNON, CERNIGLIA and REVELLI, 2003;  FELD, JOSSELIN and
ROCABOY, 2003 and SOLÉ-OLLÉ, 2003). With the exception of BESLEY and CASE (1995), the
literature has difficulties to establish a link between tax mimicking and the re-election of rep-
resentatives such that this evidence could either be interpreted as evidence for tax competition
or for yardstick competition. It is thus no surprise that, in his survey on mimicking behavior
of competing jurisdictions in the U.S. welfare system, BRUECKNER (2000) assesses these re-
sults as indicating the infamous race to the bottom phenomenon of fiscal competition.
  In tax competition models, a pre-condition for the existence of a race to the bottom is
the fiscally induced mobility of at least one production factor (WILSON, 1999). In yardstick
competition models, labor and capital are usually assumed to be physically immobile (BESLEY
and CASE, 1995; WREDE, 2001; BODENSTEIN and URSPRUNG, 2001; BESLEY and SMART,
2001; FELD, JOSSELIN and ROCABOY, 2003). Indirect evidence that helps to distinguish these
two classes of models from each other could thus use the existing extent of fiscally induced
mobility as a precondition. Given a relatively high fiscally induced mobility of factors of pro-
duction between jurisdictions, a positive correlation between the jurisdiction’s tax rate and the
average of competing jurisdictions’ tax rates would lend support to the tax competition hy-
pothesis. On the contrary, a relatively low fiscally induced mobility together with such a
positive correlation between tax rates would provide some (weak) evidence in support of the
yardstick competition model.– 4–
  In that respect, evidence from Switzerland is quite interesting. As KIRCHGÄSSNER and
POMMEREHNE (1996), POMMEREHNE, KIRCHGÄSSNER and FELD (1996), FELD (2000, 2000a),
FELD and KIRCHGÄSSNER (2001) and SCHMIDHEINY (2003) for individual income taxes and
FELD and KIRCHGÄSSNER (2003) for corporate income taxes show, fiscally induced mobility
at the Swiss cantonal and local levels is relatively important. In particular high income earners
and firms with high rates of return on capital reside or locate in places where taxes are – ce-
teris paribus – low in relative terms. Following the suggestions by BRUECKNER (2003), the
existence of strategic tax setting of Swiss sub-federal jurisdictions could hence provide such
indirect evidence for the existence of tax competition. 
  In this paper, evidence for the existence of strategic tax competition at the Swiss can-
tonal level is provided for a yearly panel data set of the 26 cantons from 1984 to 1999. Most
of the empirical analyses of strategic tax setting has been conducted for the U.S. CASE (1993)
and BESLEY and CASE (1995) provide panel evidence for U.S. states, while LADD (1992)
analyses tax mimicking at the U.S. county level and BRUECKNER and SAAVEDRA (2001) at the
city level. The outside U.S. evidence is provided by HEYNDELS and VUCHELEN (1998) for
Belgian municipalities, BÜTTNER (2001) for German local jurisdictions, BORDIGNON, CERNI-
GLIA and REVELLI (2003) for Italian municipalities, SOLÉ-OLLÉ (2003) for Spanish communi-
ties and FELD, JOSSELIN and ROCABOY (2003) for a panel of French regions. In contrast to
these studies, this paper provides the first outside U.S. evidence on strategic tax setting at the
regional level in a country with very important fiscally induced mobility
  In addition, Switzerland is particularly interesting because it is the only country in
Europe in which sub-federal jurisdictions, the cantons and communities, have a considerable
power to tax individual and corporate income (FELD and SCHNEIDER, 2001). The differences
in (effective) tax rates across Swiss cantons are much more impressive than those in any other
European country. The Swiss cantonal level thus provides excellent opportunities to study tax
competition issues. Moreover, Swiss sub-federal jurisdictions mainly finance their budgets by– 5–
income taxes, while U.S. states use sales taxes to a much larger extent. 20 percent of the reve-
nue of state and local governments in the U.S. stems from sales taxes, 17 percent from prop-
erty taxes (used at the local level) and 15 percent from individual and corporate income taxes.
19 percent of revenue are grants from the federal level and 29 percent user charges and other
revenue sources (Economic Report of the President, 1999, Table B-86). In contrast, Swiss
cantons and local jurisdictions obtain 50 percent of their revenue from individual and corpo-
rate income taxes (FELD and KIRCHGÄSSNER, 2001). This study therefore provides the first
study on individual income tax competition for a country where income taxes at the sub-
federal levels really matter quantitatively. 
  What makes the evidence in this paper particularly interesting is the distinction among
different income tax brackets. In contrast to property taxes (U.S. and French evidence), local
business taxes (German and French evidence), and individual income tax surcharges (Belgian
evidence), individual income tax schedules of the Swiss cantons are highly progressive.
Hence, it is useful to look at the strategic interdependence between jurisdictions across the
different tax brackets. CASE (1993) considers the progressivity of the income tax schedule in
her study on U.S. income tax competition by looking at the tax liability in three different tax
brackets ($ 25'000, $ 40'000, $ 100'000). The data set in this paper allows for an analysis of
the whole income tax schedule. We analyze 12 tax brackets, but report only 11 of them leav-
ing out the least interesting group of taxpayers below a yearly taxable income of Sfr 30'000 (a
100 Swiss francs being approximately 60 U.S.-$) in order to meet the adding up condition of
the reported system estimates. These data allow for an investigation as to whether tax compe-
tition exists to a different extent for different groups of taxpayers. According to our results it
appears that tax rates of individuals earning more than Sfr 100'000 taxable income a year are
to a larger extent prone to strategic interaction with competing jurisdictions than those of
lower income earners, although the differences are not extreme.– 6–
  The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, the development of selected income
tax rates for selected cantons is provided to give the reader a sense of tax competition in Swit-
zerland. The basic econometric model is presented in Section 3 and the estimation results in
Section 4. Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
2. The Development of Tax Rates in Switzerland
1
  A natural starting point for an analysis of tax competition in individual income taxa-
tion is an investigation into the race to the bottom phenomenon. It can be argued from a theo-
retical point of view that jurisdictions compete with each other by decreasing their income tax
rates repeatedly such that inefficiently low tax rates result. More exactly, ‘inefficiently low’
means that tax rates are too low to finance that level of public services that is preferred by the
residents of those jurisdictions. In the public discussion, a race to the bottom is however sim-
ply associated with decreasing tax rates across time. Such a development is often interpreted
as evidence for the existence of tax competition.
  Figures 1 to 3 exhibit the development of Swiss cantonal and local income tax rates
from 1983 to 1999 for ten selected cantons. The selection of cantons follows from the politi-
cal discussion in Switzerland according to which the agglomeration cantons, like Zurich and
Geneva, are challenged by surrounding, more rural cantons. The canton Zurich is supposed to
be in a tax competition game with the cantons of Zug, Schwyz and Nidwalden, the three can-
tons with the lowest (individual and corporate) tax rates in Switzerland. The canton Geneva is
supposed to compete mainly with Vaud, while the canton Basle-City is supposed to compete
with Basle-County. In addition, the canton Berne is included which is not very much exposed
to tax competition due to its geographical proximity to the traditionally high tax French
speaking Swiss cantons. Finally, an additional canton is included in order to control for a less
                                                          
1. A description of the Swiss tax system is provided by FELD (2000, 2000a) and FELD and KIRCHGÄSSNER
(2001) for individual income taxes and FELD and KIRCHGÄSSNER (2003) for corporate income taxes.– 7–
politically exposed jurisdiction. The composition of cantons varies somewhat due to this ad-
ditional ‘control’ canton.
Figure 1: Cantonal and (Weighted) Local Individual Income Tax Rates (in %) on Annual
Taxable Income of Less than Sfr 30'000, 1983 – 1999
  Figure 1 indicates the development of the cantonal tax rates on annual taxable income
of less than Sfr 30'000 from 1983 to 1999. It is obvious that these tax rates have considerably
declined during that period, most notably in the cantons of Geneva and Vaud. In Geneva the
low income tax rates in 1999 are only ten percent of those in 1983, in Vaud this relationship is
similar. Zurich cut its income tax rates in this income class by half, from 5 percent to 2.6 per-
cent during this time period. While the reduction in Berne is about 40 percent and thus not
pretty much less than the respective reduction in Schwyz, the level of low income taxation in
Berne remains highest in Switzerland.
  Figure 2 represents the respective development of cantonal tax rates on middle in-


















duction of income tax rates on these incomes is more modest than those presented above, it
still appears to be considerable. The canton Zurich reduced tax rates on middle incomes by 5
percentage points to 9.15 percent in 1999, which is about one third of the level in 1983. In the
case of Schwyz the reduction amounts to 40 percent; and Zug even cut its tax rates on middle
incomes by nearly one half. The reduction of these tax rates in the canton Berne is more mod-
est amounting to slightly more than a quarter. This is expected given the fact that Berne is
much less exposed to competition than Zurich. In Geneva it is less than a quarter, while Vaud
cut these rates by about a third.
Figure 2: Cantonal and (Weighted) Local Individual Income Tax Rates (in %) on Annual
Taxable Income of Sfr 80'000 to 100'000, 1983 – 1999
  The development of tax rates on income of Sfr 1 million and more from 1983 to 1999,
indicated in Figure 3 is exhibiting an even more modest decline for most cantons, most nota-
bly for Zurich, Schwyz, Zug and Nidwalden as the core example of tax competition. On the

















taxpayers in the beginning of the nineties. The development in St. Gallen can be explained by
the cantonal formal requirement to increase tax rates, when budget deficits increase above a
certain threshold. The beginning of the nineties can be characterized as a period during which
cantons experienced relatively high budget deficits due to the severe recession of the nineties.
Figure 3: Cantonal and (Weighted) Local Individual Income Tax Rates (in %) on Annual
Taxable Income of Sfr 1 Million and More, 1983 – 1999
  While the descriptive data for low incomes in Figure 1 are most clearly lending itself
to a race to the bottom interpretation, such an assessment is much less justified for higher in-
come tax brackets. At first glance, this appears to be surprising since high income taxpayers
are supposed to be more mobile than low income tax earners and the existing evidence for
Swiss cantons indicates that the residence decision of these groups of taxpayers is much more
influenced by taxation than that of low income earners. On the other hand, low income groups
get tax relief for many other reasons apart from tax competition issues. For example the can-





















reduce the implicit marginal tax rate. The tax competition game may thus be fiercer in the
middle income range than with respect to the higher income classes. Such a kind of competi-
tion may make sense when it is taken into account that middle income earners are often those
who start a career and end up with much higher salaries later on. An example would be a mar-
ried couple with university degrees thinking about having kids and looking for a place of resi-
dence to settle for a longer time period. Their starting salaries in Switzerland are in the range
of Sfr 70'000 to 100'000. Getting them before they become less mobile due to family reasons
is a reasonable goal for cantonal tax authorities. Before this example is generalized it is useful
to have a more closer look at the strategic interaction of tax setting in different Swiss cantons.
Figure 4: Cantonal and (Weighted) Local Individual Income Tax Rates (in %) on Annual

























  In Figure 4, the Swiss cantons are grouped according to their income tax rates on an-
nual taxable incomes of Sfr 500'000 and more in order to illustrate the potentially occurring
strategic interaction among cantons. The red (dark grey) cantons comprise the group with the
lowest tax burden between 12 percent (Zug) and 20 percent (Graubuenden). The green (mid-
dle grey) cantons are those with tax burdens between 21 percent (Glarus) and 24 percent– 11 –
(Aargau), while the yellow (light grey) cantons have tax rates between 24 percent (Thurgau)
and 28 percent (Geneva). This classification into three groups is useful, although the range in
the low tax group is higher than in the two other groups. The income tax burden is usually
higher in the Western than in the Eastern part of Switzerland. However, in each larger geo-
graphical area, cantons with relatively low tax rates exist that challenge the higher tax eco-
nomic centers. This holds for the comparison of Zurich with Zug and Schwyz, but also for St.
Gallen with both Appenzell or Berne with Fribourg and the Valais. This geographical pattern
somewhat reflects the illustrations from Figures 1 to 3, but it also points to the fact that stra-
tegic interaction may take place in two different ways. On the one hand, and quite obvious
from Figure 4, geographical neighbors compete with each other. On the other hand, larger
geographical areas, the metropolitan centers with their lower tax surrounding areas may com-
pete with each other, for example Geneva with Zurich. Such a kind of twofold strategic tax
competition should be reflected in the econometric specification to which we now turn.
3. An Econometric Analysis for Swiss Cantons
  The basic econometric specification follows the models of CASE (1993), BÜTTNER
(2001) and FELD, JOSSELIN and ROCABOY (2003). The two latter papers also present theoreti-
cal models as a basis for the econometric specification, FELD, JOSSELIN and ROCABOY (2003)
a yardstick competition model and BÜTTNER (2001) a tax competition model. It thus suffices
in this paper to draw the basic lines of arguments. These theoretical models of tax (and of
yardstick) competition suggest that the tax rates in each canton depend on tax rates of com-
peting jurisdictions. In the econometric specifications used here, we first assume that the in-
come tax rates in canton i are influenced by the (unweighted average of) income tax rates in
geographically neighboring cantons. By taking the unweighted average of neighbors’ tax
rates, we weight each neighbor of each canton equally. In a second subsequent specification,
we assume that the taxes in canton i are influenced by the geographically neighboring cantons– 12 –
both at the local level and at the regional level. Each neighbor j of a canton i has its own
neighbors k which influence the tax rates of canton j. Neighboring cantons at the regional
level of a canton i thus correspond to the local cantonal neighbors for each of the local neigh-
bors of a canton i. This specification follows HEYNDELS and VUCHELEN (1997) implicitly hy-
pothesizing that the influence of the fiscal policy of neighboring cantons at the regional level
should be lower than the one of neighboring cantons at the local level.
  In addition to neighbors’ taxes, a few other economic and demographic variables have
an impact on tax policy at the Swiss cantonal level. Cantonal tax policies do not only depend
on the capacity to generate revenue by own taxes, but also on grants from other jurisdictions.
Thus, we include federal lump-sum grants per capita in the analysis reflecting the availability
of alternative funds. We do not include spending variables or bond financing in order to cir-
cumvent (additional) endogeneity problems. Moreover, we introduce standard control vari-
ables like cantonal income per capita, the cantonal unemployment rate as a proxy for business
cycle developments and the accompanying necessity to increase social welfare spending and
financing, and demographic factors like population size, the share of the population younger
than 20 years and older than 65 years. A regional dummy is included that takes on the value
of one for German speaking cantons and zero otherwise. As mentioned above, it is well-
known that tax rates are higher in French and Italian speaking cantons than in the German
speaking ones. These differences might reflect cultural differences between the Swiss cantons
that have to be considered to avoid an omitted variable bias in the estimates. The estimation
equation of the first specification thus finally becomes:
2
  (1) , ˆ
1 2 1 1 0 ε β β β + + + = − − t
g
t
g g X t t
where 
g
t t 1 ˆ
−  is a [NT×1] vector of the average of cantons’ geographic neighbors’ taxes of the
previous period for T years in income class g; Xt-1 is an [NT×k] matrix of k observable can
                                                          
2. See again CASE (1993) pp. 141. – 13 –
tons’ economic and demographic characteristics of the preceding period, 
g
0 β  is a constant
term for each income class g and ε  is an error term which is assumed to be normally distrib-
uted with zero mean and constant variance. The parameter  1 β  indicates to what extent a can-
ton’s tax policy is influenced by the tax policy in neighboring cantons. We estimate this
model in a specification with time fixed effects for the levels of the eleven different tax rates
comprising the income tax schedule. Due to these different tax brackets, equation (1) de-
scribes a system of eleven equations which vary according to the income tax rate in each in-
come class g and the neighboring cantons’ tax rates of each income class g. The vector Xt-1 of
economic and demographic control variables remains the same for all eleven classes. The
eleven tax brackets are the following ones:
Sfr 30’000 < Y1 > Sfr 50’000; Sfr 50’000 < Y2 < Sfr 60’000;
Sfr 60’000 < Y3 < Sfr 80’000; Sfr 80’000 < Y4 < Sfr 100’000;
Sfr 100’000 < Y5 < Sfr 150’000; Sfr 150’000 < Y6 < Sfr 200’000;
Sfr 200’000 < Y7 < Sfr 300’000; Sfr 300’000 < Y8 < Sfr 400’000;
Sfr 400’000 < Y9 < Sfr 500’000; Sfr 500’000 < Y10 < Sfr 1’000’000;
Y11 ≥ Sfr 1’000’000;
with Yg as taxable income in income class g. Data on average effective tax rates across time
are consistently available for these eleven income classes only for married taxpayers without
children. The difference to singles and married taxpayers with two children, as the other two
types of (‘normal’) taxpayers available is not very important, but tax rates on retiree income
deviates considerably. This is something that should be kept in mind for the next section.
  Equation (1) cannot be consistently estimated by OLS because there is an obvious en-
dogeneity problem. Hausman tests indicate that the neighboring tax rates at the local level or
at the regional level are endogenous (available upon request). So  1 β  is correlated with the
error term ε and OLS estimates will be biased and inconsistent. Thus, we basically estimate
our system by using instrumental variables. We follow BÜTTNER (2001) who uses a method– 14 –
proposed by KELEJIAN and ROBINSON (1993) and KELEJIAN and PRUCHA (1998) using spatial
lags of the local characteristics as instruments. The instruments are the (unweighted) averages
of the economic and demographic controls Xt-1 of the neighbors.
  An additional problem arises because the data set used has a panel structure making
the existence of a first-order autocorrelation in the error terms highly probable (see Figures 1
to 3). Instead of using a lagged endogenous variable and instruments to control for potential
biases, we correct the standard errors for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity by using a




  Table 1 contains the results for the baseline model in which the neighboring jurisdic-
tions are supposed to be the only competitors of the canton under consideration. The overall
performance of the model is relatively well. The adjusted R
2 indicates that 66 to 76 percent of
the variance of the different income tax rates in the system can be explained. The Jarque-Bera
test statistics indicate that the hypothesis of normal distribution can be rejected for five of the
eleven income groups at least on the ten percent level. Among these income groups are mid-
dle/upper income classes from Sfr 200'000 to less than Sfr 400'000. Since these are relatively
important groups, the problem of non-normality of the residuals is going to be addressed sub-
sequently. 
  As the 
2 χ -statistics in the last column of Table 1 indicate, the hypothesis that neigh-
bors’ tax rates of the previous period have no impact on the income tax rate of the canton un-
der consideration cannot be rejected at any conventional significance level for the whole sys-
tem of equations. However, in each single income class except for the lower one, neighbors’
tax rates of the previous period are significantly different from zero at least on the 5 percent
significance level. For the nine classes of incomes higher than Sfr 60'000 annual taxable in– 15 –
come, neighbors’ tax rates are even significant on the 1 percent level. In addition, there is a
positive relationship between the income tax rates of a canton and those of its neighbors indi-
cating that cantons appear to reduce their tax rates when the neighbors reduce them and in-
crease tax rates when neighbors increase them. Of the control variables, only population size
and the share of the old population are significantly different from zero for the whole system
according to the 
2 χ -statistics. Since higher tax rates for married taxpayers without children –
ceteris paribus – imply lower tax rates for retirees, the significantly positive coefficients for
the old population, in particular in the lower income groups, is no surprise. 
– Table 1 about here –
  The estimation results presented in Table 2 are robust estimations controlling for out-
liers with dummy variables (as mentioned in the notes to Table 2). The Jarque-Bera test sta-
tistics now indicate that the hypothesis of normal distribution of the residuals can be rejected
only at the 10 percent level for income classes from Sfr 400'000 to less than Sfr 500'000. This
hypothesis is also rejected at the 5 percent level for the income class from Sfr 500'000 to less
than Sfr 1'000'000. The explanatory power of the model increases. The adjusted R
2 is now at
least at 0.74. Moreover, for ten of the eleven income classes in the system, 80 to 85 percent of
the variance can be explained. The 
2 χ -statistics in the final column of Table 2 indicate that
the explanatory power of the single variables increases as well. This does not only hold for
the two control variables mentioned before. In addition, the neighbors’ tax rate and the re-
gional dummy variable are now significant for the whole system on the 1 and 5 percent level
respectively. Moreover the influences of the population and the share of old population in-
crease. Finally, lump-sum grants are significantly different from zero on the 5 percent level
for income classes from Sfr 100'000 to less than Sfr 300'000. As the sign of the coefficient is
negative, we can say that a rise in the amount of lump-sum grants induces a decrease of the
tax rate for the middle and middle-upper income classes. As the coefficients for the regional
dummy indicate, the German speaking cantons have significantly lower tax rates than other– 16 –
cantons. This result appears to be stronger for the middle income classes. Again, the hypothe-
sis that cantonal income tax rates positively depend upon respective neighbor’s tax rates can-
not be rejected according to our results. It is interesting to note that in the income class of Sfr
30'000 to less than Sfr 50'000, neighbors’ tax rates are significant but only on the 5 percent
level. This corroborates the conjecture mentioned in Section 2 that the common trend of de-
clining tax rates in this income class is not only induced by tax competition.
– Table 2 about here –
  The estimated coefficients of the average of neighbors’ tax rates of the previous period
increase with income up to the income class of Sfr 200'000 to less than Sfr 300'000. The coef-
ficients decline in the remaining three upper income groups to levels below the one estimated
in the income class of Sfr 200'000, but are still higher than those in the income groups below
Sfr 80'000. As the results of the Wald tests on equality of paired coefficients presented in Ta-
ble 3 indicates, these differences are however not statistically significant. 
Table 3 about here –
  The smaller region kind of tax competition between neighbors may not be the only
way tax competition takes place. Larger regional areas might be in locational competition
with each other. In order to check the possibility that tax rates of a canton are influenced by
the tax setting behavior of local and regional neighboring cantons, though perhaps to different
extents, the following model is proposed: 

















−  is a [NT×1] vector of the average of cantons’ local neighbors’ taxes of the pre-





−  is a [NT×1] vector of the average of
cantons’ regional neighbors’ (the neighbors’ of the neighbors’) taxes of the previous period
for T years in income class g. The parameters  1 γ
1 and  2 γ
β indicate to what extent a canton’s
tax policy is influenced by the tax policy of local neighboring cantons and of regional neigh– 17 –
boring cantons respectively. We estimate this model for the eleven different tax rates com-
prising the income tax schedule. The results are presented in Table 4.
– Table 4 about here –
  The overall performance of the model (2) is quite well because 67 to 76 percent of the
variance of the different equations of the system can be explained. The 
2 χ -statistics indicates
that four explanatory variables are significantly different from zero for the whole system.
These are the local neighbors’ tax, the regional neighbors’ (the neighbors’ of the neighbors’)
tax and also the population and the share of the older population. With respect to demographic
and economic variables, the estimated coefficients and the Wald tests associated to them are
quite similar to those obtained by estimating model (1).
  But focusing on the mimicking coefficients at the local and at the regional level pro-
vides interesting insights. First, all the mimicking coefficients at the local level are signifi-
cantly different from zero on the 5 percent and for the nine highest income classes on the 1
percent level. Those coefficients are positive and quite similar in size to those estimated in
model (1). Choosing a specification for the estimation model which enlarges the geographical
area of competitive cantons thus leads to similar results as far as tax mimicking behavior at
the local level is concerned. Second, this new system allows to consider a possible influence
of tax setting in neighboring cantons at the regional level. It is interesting to note that, al-
though the 
2 χ -statistic is significant on the 5 percent level for the whole system, the coeffi-
cients of the regional neighboring tax rates (the neighbors’ of the neighbors’) are significantly
different from zero on the 5 percent level only for the income classes from Sfr 50'000 to less
than Sfr 150'000. The absolute size of local and regional mimicking coefficients is quite
similar for those income classes. Third, the results of the Wald test of equality of paired coef-
ficients indicate that the intensity of tax mimicking at the local level is the same for all in-
come classes (Table 5). Moreover, at the regional level, tax mimicking has a similar magni-
tude in the income classes from Sfr 50'000 to less than Sfr 150'000 (Table 6). And in each– 18 –
equation for income classes from Sfr 50'000 to less than Sfr 150'000, it is not possible to re-
ject the hypothesis that the intensity of mimicking at the local level is similar to the one at the
regional level (Table 7). 
– Table 5, 6, 7 about here –
  All those results provide evidence for the strategic tax setting behavior of cantonal
authorities. When tax rates for the income classes from Sfr 50'000 to less than Sfr 150'000 are
politically decided, the cantonal finance secretary at the same time pays attention to the local
as well as to the regional neighboring tax rates of the previous period. But as regards the other
income classes, only the tax rate of local neighboring cantons of the previous period appears
to be considered. This result could be explained by the fact that taxpayers in the income
classes from Sfr 50'000 to less than Sfr 150'000 correspond to young adults who just start
working. For those couples, it is a crucial moment of their life because they have to decide the
place where they want to reside. These young couples are going to consider a residence place
within a larger range than others. This evidence of strategic tax setting corresponds nicely
with the results by FELD (2000, 2000a) and FELD and KIRCHGÄSSNER (2001) for cross sec-
tions of Swiss cantons in 1990 on the one hand and FELD and FREY (2000) for a panel of
Swiss cantons in the period from 1981/82 to 1993/94 on the other hand. While these cross
section studies find the quantitatively most important negative impact of tax rates in the in-
come class of Sfr 100'000 and above, this panel data analysis finds the strongest negative im-
pact for the income classes between Sfr 75’000 and 200'000.
– Table 8 about here –
  Non-normality of the residuals in some income classes is a similar problem in this
specification as it is before. Controlling for outliers improves the estimates once again. It
should be noted from the results of Table 8 that, controlling for outliers, the lump-sum grants
and the regional dummy become significant at the 5 percent and 10 percent level for the– 19 –
whole system. Otherwise, the structure of estimates remains relatively robust and confirms the
results about the mimicking behavior of cantonal authorities.
5. Concluding Remarks
  Tax competition is of great public interest in particular in the European Union. Nev-
ertheless empirical evidence strongly establishing the existence, not mentioning the ineffi-
ciency, of tax competition is scarce. Obtaining such evidence is the more important, since
competing theoretical hypotheses as to the usefulness of tax competition exist. 
  In this paper, evidence on strategic tax setting is provided on the basis of a simultane-
ous equations model with eleven income tax rates for the Swiss cantons using panel data from
1984 to 1999. The results lend support for the hypothesis that strategic interactions between
sub-federal jurisdictions in Switzerland exist. Income tax rates in the cantons – ceteris paribus
– depend positively on local neighbors’ tax rates of the previous period for all taxable income
classes and also on regional neighbors’ (the neighbors’ of the neighbors’) tax rates of the pre-
vious period for taxable income classes from Sfr 50'000 to less than Sfr 150'000. If neighbor-
ing cantons reduce their income taxes, the canton of consideration reduces its tax rates as
well. This result indicates that the largest extent of tax competition among neighbors is ob-
tained for middle income groups. 
  The results are in line with evidence obtained for the U.S. sub-federal jurisdictions, for
Canadian provinces or municipalities of British Columbia, but also for Belgian and Italian
municipalities and Spanish and German local jurisdictions. In addition to the new insights
from the evidence over a whole range of income tax rates presented in this paper, the results
are however also adding to the current understanding of individual income tax competition in
Switzerland. Since Swiss taxpayers choose their place of residence in cantons where they find
favorable tax conditions (FELD and KIRCHGÄSSNER, 2001), a spatial interdependence of in-
come tax rates provides evidence for the existence of tax competition in Switzerland. – 20 –
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Table 1: GMM-Model of Strategic Tax Setting, Neighbors’ Tax, 26 Swiss Cantons, 1984 – 1999










































































































































































































































F-Test: Time Effects 36.72** 42.44** 41.64** 42.74** 34.40** 25.02* 17.92 8.83 6.88 5.83 4.31
2 R   0.71 0.74 0.76 0.74 0.70 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.68 0.69 0.73
SER  1.02 1.11 1.13 1.28 1.47 1.74 1.84 2.01 2.16 2.24 2.43
Jarque-Bera 2.39 2.81 1.65 13.58** 9.25** 1.66 10.47** 6.13* 2.10 1.20 5.75(*)
Notes: GMM-Time series (HAC) under the options : one step weighting matrix, iterate coefficient, Pre-whitening, Kernel Options Bartlett, Bandwidth selection Andrews. The num-
bers in parentheses are the t statistics of estimated parameters. ‘**’ ,’*’, ‘(*)’ denote significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent levels, respectively.  2 R  is the adjusted coefficient of
determination. SER is the standard error of regression and J.-B. the value of the Jarque-Bera-test on normality of the residuals.– 23 –
Table 2: Robustness of the GMM-Model of Strategic Tax Setting to Outliers, Neighbors’ Tax, 26 Swiss Cantons, 1984 – 1999
Notes:  GMM-Time series (HAC) under the options: one step weighting matrix, iterate coefficient, Pre-whitening, Kernel Options Bartlett, Bandwidth selection Andrews. The
numbers in parentheses are the t statistics of estimated parameters. ‘**’ ,’*’, ‘(*)’ denote significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent levels, respectively. 
2 R  is the adjusted coeffi-
cient of determination. SER is the standard error of regression and J.-B. the value of the Jarque-Bera-test on normality of the residuals. Outliers are the cantons of Luzern,
































































































































































































































































































































































F-Test: Time Effects 77.24** 104.19** 122.28** 139.94** 121.84** 83.53** 70.26** 38.87** 19.58 11.18 4.67
2 R   0.74 0.80 0.83 0.85 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.83
SER  0.96 0.97 0.95 0.99 1.11 1.28 1.32 1.35 1.49 1.64 1.92
Jarque-Bera 2.62 3.49 1.79 2.57 3.50 1.67 1.50 1.68 4.90(*) 7.09* 4.05– 24 –





















Neighbors’ TAX 30 -
Neighbors’ TAX 50 0.19 -
Neighbors’ TAX 60 0.96 1.64 -
Neighbors’ TAX 80 1.91 2.69 1.56 -
Neighbors’ TAX 100 2.00 2.36 1.21 0.37 -
Neighbors’ TAX 150 2.13 2.20 1.01 0.27 0.07 -
Neighbors’ TAX 200 1.95 2.10 0.95 0.26 0.10 0.02 -
Neighbors’ TAX 300 1.85 1.69 0.71 0.17 0.05 0.01 0.00 -
Neighbors’ TAX 400 1.71 1.44 0.59 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 -
Neighbors’ TAX 500 1.56 1.24 0.49 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 -
Neighbors’ TAX 1m 1.58 1.22 0.57 0.17 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.20
Note :  The cells contain the absolute values of the 
2 χ -test statistics of the Wald test. ‘**’ ,’*’, ‘(*)’ denote significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent levels, respectively.– 25 –
































































































































































































































































F-Test: Time Effects 57.92** 60.76** 58.48** 53.12** 42.00** 30.34* 21.93 10.94 8.42 7.31 6.26
2 R   0.71 0.74 0.76 0.75 0.72 0.69 0.68 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.68
SER  1.01 1.12 1.13 1.27 1.44 1.65 1.78 2.00 2.16 2.26 2.65
Jarque-Bera 4.28 8.13* 10.38** 8.17* 2.69 9.09* 17.57** 6.54* 1.31 0.00 3.77
Notes:  GMM-Time series (HAC) under the options : one step weighting matrix, iterate coefficient, Pre-whitening, Kernel Options Bartlett, Bandwidth selection Andrews. The
numbers in parentheses are the t statistics of estimated parameters. ‘**’ ,’*’, ‘(*)’ denote significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent levels, respectively. 
2 R  is the adjusted coeffi-
cient of determination. SER is the standard error of regression and J.-B. the value of the Jarque-Bera-test on normality of the residuals.– 26 –










































0.03 1.01 0.49 -
Local Neighbors’
TAX 100
0.02 0.62 0.18 0.01 -
Local Neighbors’
TAX 150
0.07 0.74 0.30 0.08 0.24 -
Local Neighbors’
TAX 200
0.10 0.82 0.39 0.15 0.30 0.06 -
Local Neighbors’
TAX 300
0.21 1.05 0.58 0.34 0.45 0.22 0.25 -
Local Neighbors’
TAX 400
0.24 1.04 0.59 0.35 0.43 0.24 0.24 0.08 -
Local Neighbors’
TAX 500
0.25 1.01 0.58 0.34 0.41 0.24 0.22 0.07 0.04 -
Local Neighbors’
TAX 1m
0.74 2.05 1.50 1.16 1.24 1.02 1.16 1.16 1.66 2.55
Note :  The cells contain the absolute values of the 
2 χ -test statistics of the Wald test. ‘**’ ,’*’, ‘(*)’ denote significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent levels, respectively.– 27 –










































2.06 0.06 0.08 -
Regional Neighbors’
TAX 100
1.75 0.04 0.05 0.00 -
Regional Neighbors’
TAX 150
0.66 0.22 0.38 1.44 2.94(*) -
Regional Neighbors’
TAX 200
0.38 0.41 0.62 1.58 2.47 0.68 -
Regional Neighbors’
TAX 300
0.22 0.42 0.55 1.05 1.34 0.34 0.10 -
Regional Neighbors’
TAX 400
0.12 0.47 0.58 0.97 1.15 0.36 0.17 0.17 -
Regional Neighbors’
TAX 500
0.08 0.51 0.61 0.95 1.08 0.37 0.20 0.19 0.17 -
Regional Neighbors’
TAX 1m
0.28 0.09 0.11 0.20 0.22 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.40 1.00
Note : The cells contain the absolute values of the 
2 χ -test statistics of the Wald test. ‘**’ ,’*’, ‘(*)’ denote significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent levels, respectively.– 28 –



































































Note :  The cells contain the absolute values of the 
2 χ -test statistics of the Wald test. ‘**’ ,’*’, ‘(*)’ denote significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent levels, respectively.– 29 –
































































































































































































































































































































































F-Test: Time Effects 83.64** 104.65** 105.60** 95.46** 76.53** 63.80** 49.24** 18.59 11.75 9.50 7.38
2 R   0.72 0.76 0.80 0.80 0.79 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81
SER  1.01 1.06 1.04 1.13 1.25 1.30 1.35 1.51 1.67 1.78 2.06
Jarque-Bera 7.20* 2.48 6.61* 5.40(*) 1.25 0.55 0.65 5.48(*) 3.36 1.86 0.79
Notes:  GMM-Time series (HAC) under the options : one step weighting matrix, iterate coefficient, Pre-whitening, Kernel Options Bartlett, Bandwidth selection Andrews. The
numbers in parentheses are the t statistics of estimated parameters. ‘**’ ,’*’, ‘(*)’ denote significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent levels, respectively. 
2 R  is the adjusted coeffi-
cient of determination. SER is the standard error of regression and J.-B. the value of the Jarque-Bera-test on normality of the residuals. Outliers are the cantons of Appenzell
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